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1 Introduction 
The present paper contains some preliminary findings on the extent 
investment analysts discuss accounting changes in their investment reports. 
Putting it more specifically, to what extent do investment analysts appear 
to be fixated on accounting numbers? We distinguish two levels of fixation, 
viz., fixation at the strong and weak level. Furthermore, we discuss four 
(possible) determinants of the fixation of investment analysts on 
accounting numbers. By examining existing investment reports, we have put 
our study in a real world setting. Most research with respect to the 
incidence of fixation is done in an experimental setting. 
In section 2 we discuss the concept of functional fixation. Section 3 
contains an overview of similar research. In section 4 the research design 
is set out. We present the research findings in section 5. The final 
section contains a summary. 
2 The Concept of Functional Fixation 
The functional fixation hypothesis has its roots in the psychology. 
Psychologists found that individual's prior use of an object in a function 
dissimilar to that required by a present problem would prevent the 
individual from discovering an appropriate new use for the object.1 The 
hypothesis was introduced in the accounting literature by Ijiri, Jaedicke 
and Knight (1966) . The authors placed functional fixation in an accounting 
context as follows: "If the outputs from different accounting methods are 
called by the same name, such as profit, cost, etc, people who do not 
understand accounting well tend to neglect the fact that alternative 
methods may have been used to prepare the outputs. In such cases, a change 
in the accounting process clearly influences the decisions" (p. 194). As 
Ashton (1976, p. 4) properly observed, the analogy with the psychology 
literature is not an exact parallel. Functional fixation in psychology is 
concerned with fixation on the functions of objects, whereas Ijiri, 
Jaedicke and Knight suggested the occurence of fixation on accounting 
outputs ignoring the underlying accounting methods. Chang and Birnberg 
(1977, p. 300) therefore consider the choice of the term functional 
fixation not wholly appropriate. The concept brought to the accounting 
literature by Ijiri, Jaedicke and Knight is labelled by them as data 
fixity. 
For the purpose of the current study we distinguish the following two 
levels of fixation: 
(1) fixation at the strong level: investment analysts do not note 
accounting changes in their investment reports at all; 
(2) fixation at the weak level: investment analysts note accounting 
changes in their investment reports but omit a discussion of its 
effects on accounting numbers. 
We consider investment analysts who discuss the effects of accounting 
changes on accounting numbers in their investment reports as being not at 
all fixated. 
However, it should be emphasized that if an investment analyst refrains 
from a discussion of an accounting change in his investment report this not 
necessarily means that he is not aware of the accounting change and its 
effects on accounting numbers, i.e., he is not necessarily behaving 
irrationally. Thus actually we do not know if the investment analyst in 
Ashton (1976, pp. 2-3) discusses some experiments done in this field. 
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that case is really functionally fixated. The decision not to discuss the 
accounting change in his investment reports might be due to the f act that 
the accounting change relates to a piece of data which the investment 
analyst considers to be irrelevant to his decision or the investment 
analyst may decide that the benefits of a better judgment will not outweigh 
the costs of learning how to process the accounting change. In that case 
the investment analyst is acting consciously and from his point of view 
also rationally with regard to the accounting change. The role of the 
investment analyst as an intermediary, however, should be borne in mind. If 
an investment analyst does not discuss the accounting change in his 
investment reports explicitly, i.e., he acts as if he is functionally 
fixated, this could reinforce the functional fixation of users of the 
investment reports written by that investment analyst. 
In the current study we do not provide the term 'fixation' with the 
adjective 'functional', because in the accounting literature functional 
fixation is often associated with irrational behaviour. On the basis of the 
investment reports it is not possible to distinguish unambiguously between 
the rational form and irrational form of fixation. 
3 Similar Studies 
In the psychology literature the éxperiments to test the functional 
fixation hypothesis were time-series oriented, dealing with the behaviour 
of individuals trying to discover an alternative function for a certain 
object after undergoing pre-utilization training (Ashton, 1976, p. 3). In 
the accounting literature, however, functional fixation is given both a 
time-series and cross-sectional orientation. With respect to the time-
series oriented studies the influence of changes in accounting methods over 
time are examined, whereas with respect to the cross-sectional oriented 
studies the influence of alternative accounting methods at a certain time 
are examined. Most accounting studies on functional fixation have a cross-
sectional orientation. 
Studies concerning the influence of accounting changes on users' judgments 
or decisions can be of the market reaction type or the behavioural type. In 
the studies of the market reaction type the aggregated response of a group 
of users on accounting changes is examined, whereas in the studies of the 
behavioural type the interface between accounting changes and the behaviour 
of individual users Is paramount. Most of the research on the effects of 
accounting changes is of the market reaction type, whereas the behavioural 
type studies are scarce. Studies of the behavioural type can be classified 
as examinations on the field of management accounting or financial 
accounting. In the former category the influence of accounting changes on 
the judgments or decisions of internal users (like managers) is examined 
and in the latter category this is done concerning external users (like 
investment analysts). The following table gives an overview of studies on 
these fields. 
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Table 1: Overview Time-Series Oriented Behavioural Type Studies 
Research methodology Management accounting Financial accounting 
Experiment with non-
professional participants 
Ashton (1976) 
Swieringa, Dyckman and Hoskin (1979) 
Dyckman, Hoskin and Swieringa (1982) 
Bloom, Elgers and Murray (1984) 
Merchant (1990) 
Feenstra (1985) 
Experiment with 
professional participants 
Barnes and Webb (1986) Feenstra (1985) 
Abdel-khalik and Keiler (1979) 
Field study: axamination 
in real world setting 
It is obvious from table 1 that the studies were all put into an 
experimental setting. As far as we know there are no studies that were put 
into a real world setting up to the time of writing. The number of time-
series oriented behavioural type studies among external users is very 
limited, viz., Abdel-khalik and Keiler (1979) and Feenstra (1985). 
An important consideration to put studies into an experimental setting is 
to ensure a high degree of internal validity, i.e., arranging dependent and 
independent variables in such a way that it is possible to detect 
unequivocally the influence of manipulations of a certain independent 
variable (e.g., the inventory valuation method) on the dependent variable 
(e.g., the recommendation of investment analysts). However, a high degree 
of internal validity is often accompanied by a low degree of external 
validity. This means that the conclusions drawn in an experiment are not 
simply valid in a real world setting, i.e., the conclusions are not 
generalizable beyond the experimental setting. It is obvious that the use 
in experiments of non-professional participants might be a major drawback. 
Wilner and Birnberg (1986, p. 75) properly consider the use of subjects 
capable of understanding the status quo and the accounting change to be 
introduced as a necessary condition for fixation studies. Failure to 
understand the situation can lead to inappropriate information processing, 
but this is not true fixation. As Wilner and Birnberg (1986, p. 78) further 
notice experiments which use professionals as participants have also raised 
other issues, e.g., with respect to the extent the participants do care 
about the progress of the study and the extent the task is realistic enough 
to evoke 'on-the-job' behaviour. In other words, the investment analysts 
might act in a way different form the way they would act in a real world 
situation. 
The problems addressed above could be overcome by abandoning experiments 
and examining the real world situation instead. In a field study the 
researcher simply observes and records the behaviour. In our study we do 
that through the examination of the investment reports written by 
investment analysts with respect to individual companies that adopted 
changes in accounting principles. However, there are problems concerning 
the internal validity of field studies. It might be difficult to isolate 
the effects of an accounting change on the judgments of investment 
analysts, because these judgments are determined by a range of variables. 
The investment analysts' judgments are a function of the expectations 
formed about the future performance of a company, e.g., the company's 
financial and business history, its size, its financial structure, its 
contractual commitments (such as leases), its investment programs and other 
variables of relevance to the future operation of the company could affect 
the judgments made by investment analysts. Thus compared to experiments 
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there is an increase in realism, but a decrease in control over the study. 
The latter means that the possibility of testing the functional fixation 
hypothesis in a real world setting by just looking at the changes in the 
investment analysts' judgments (or recommendations) is questionable. 
4 Research Design 
In this section we discuss the selection of accounting changes, the 
collection of investment reports, the index of fixation and the developed 
hypotheses. 
4.1 Selection of Accounting Changes 
The accounting changes examined in the present study meet the following 
criteria: 
they are, at least to some extent, disclosed in the annual reports; 
they have a material effect on net income or shareholders' equity, 
i.e., net income or shareholders' equity is affected by at least 5 
per cent. 
The disclosure criterion is of importance, because without any announcement 
of the accounting change the failure of the investment analysts to note the 
change would not be a consequence of fixation but ignorance. With respect 
to each accounting change an index of disclosure is calculated based on the 
information concerning the accounting change provided in the annual report 
of the year of the accounting change. The formula runs as follows: 
6 
i-l 
6 
E Ri 
i-l 
„ _ 1 if applicable 
1
 0 if not applicable 
1 if yes 
1
 0 if no 
(l)-(6): disclosure elements 
Based on the legislation (section 384, paragraph 6 and section 363, 
paragraph 5, Civil Code Book 2) and Annual Reporting Guidelines (guideline 
1.06), we distinguish the following disclosure elements regarding the 
information provided in the annual reports with respect to accounting 
changes: 
(1) the fact that a change in accounting principles is adopted (this is 
mentioned explicitly under the heading 'accounting change' or 
something similar); 
(2) a description of the differences between the new and old accounting 
method; 
(3) the reason(s) for the accounting change; 
(4) the cumulative effect of the accounting change; 
(5) the year effect of the accounting change on net income and 
shareholders' equity of the current financial year; 
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(6) the flgures of the preceding year adjusted to the new accounting 
method. 
When determining the level of disclosure with respect to a certain 
accounting change we do not consider the extent the multi-annual summaries 
are adjusted and the extent information is provided concerning the 
(possible) influence of the accounting change on subsequent financial 
years. These (additional) disclosure elements are required by the Annual 
Reporting Guidelines only. They are not directly an outcome of the 
applicable sections in the law. Furthermore, it is often very difficult to 
provide that kind of infomation. 
The materiality criterion is of importance, because accounting changes with 
an immaterial effect on net income or shareholders' equity are not expected 
to be relevant in investment analysis. The effects on net income and 
shareholders' equity are calculated according to the next formulae: 
net income: 
Ei,t 
Ie,t 
shareholders' equity: 
Es,t 
Se,t 
Ei: effect of the accounting change on net income 
Es: effect of the accounting change on shareholders' equity 
at the end of financial year 
Ie: net income exclusive of Ei 
Se: shareholders' equity exclusive of Es 
t : financial year the accounting change was adopted 
In addition, it should be noted that the accounting changes considered in 
the present study all occurred in the 1987-1991 financial statements of the 
40 most actively traded companies on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The 
latter restriction is introduced because these companies are analyzed more 
intensively and on a more regular basis by investment analysts than the 
other listed companies. Banks, insurance companies and investment companies 
are excluded in the current study, because of financial reporting 
differences. 
On the basis of the criteria discussed above, we have selected 16 
accounting changes divided among the following categories: 
(1) changes in the treatment of investment grants; 
(2) capitalization of publishing rights; 
(3) changes from current cost to historical cost accounting; 
(4) miscellaneous accounting changes. 
Generally, the first affect net income, the second shareholders' equity and 
the third both net income and shareholders' equity. 
U.2 Collection of Investment Reports 
After the selection of accounting changes we had to collect proper 
investment reports. They had to meet the following criteria: 
(1) written in the relevant period, i.e., from the first announcement of 
the accounting change by the company up to and including the ultimate 
disclosure of the accounting change in its annual report. Sometimes 
these events coincide; 
(2) accounting information should be used, i.e., investment analysts 
should refer explicitly to accounting information. Clearly, 
accounting changes and their influence on accounting numbers are 
irrelevant if that is not the case. 
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With the help of the annual reports, interim reports and press releases of 
the companies we have determined the first announcement dates of the 
accounting changes. We have also taken into consideration that in some 
instances companies announced accounting changes for the first time 
verbally, e.g., at press conferences. It appeared that in six cases 
companies announced the accounting changes for the first time in their 
annual reports, whereas in four cases this was done earlier at the release 
of the preliminary or final annual returns. In six cases the first 
announcement was even done in the preceding annual report or at the release 
of the final annual returns of the preceding financial year. 
Because accounting changes are announced at different occasions and because 
investment analysts do not analyze the companies involved in our study with 
the same regularity, we have examined all the investment reports published 
from the moment the accounting change was announced for the first time up 
to and including the ultimate disclosure of the accounting change in the 
annual report. 
In the investment reports, generally, fundamental analysis was applied 
combined with ratio analysis. Sometimes the investment reports also 
contained a technical analysis section. fl-analysis, on the other hand, was 
hardly ever applied. That fl-analysis was hardly ever applied in the 
investment reports is explicable because they in principle are related to 
one company only. We have excluded from our examination the investment 
reports that did not refer to accounting information at all. 
4.3 Index of Fixation 
With the help of the investment reports we have examined whether changes in 
an accounting principle are noted by the investment analysts and, if that 
is the case, to what extent these changes are taken into account by them 
when analyzing companies. As discussed earlier we distinguish two levels of 
fixation: 
(1) investment analysts that do not note the accounting change in their 
reports at all are considered to be fixated at the strong level; 
(2) investment analysts that note the accounting change but omit a 
discussion of its effects on accounting numbers in whole or in part 
are considered to be fixated at the weak level. 
Investment analysts are considered not to be fixated if the effects of the 
accounting change on accounting numbers are discussed fully in their 
reports. The level of fixation of an investment analyst is based on all 
relevant reports made by that investment analyst. 
With regard to each accounting change we calculate an index of fixation 
according to the following formula: 
n 
E wA 
i-1 
n 
1.0 if fixated at strong level 
Wt - 0.5 if fixated at weak level 
0.0 if not fixated 
n : number of investment analysts 
An index value equal to 1.0 means that all investment analysts appear to be 
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fixated at the strong level and an index value equal to 0.0 means that no 
investment analyst appears to be fixated at all. Thus the index of fixation 
is designed to be an indicator of the overall level of fixation of the 
investment analysts with respect to a certain accounting change. 
Contrary to the experiments discussed in section 3, we are not able to 
isolate the influence of changes in accounting principles on the judgments 
or recommendations of investment analysts, i.e., we cannot control all the 
other variables that might affect their judgments (or recommendations). 
However, the likelihood that the judgments (or recommendations) of 
investment analysts are affected might depend on their level of fixation. 
4.4 Developed Hypotheses 
The central hypothesis in our study, stated in the null-alternative font, 
is as follows: 
Investnient analysts do not appear to be fixated on accounting 
numbers. They take into consideration accounting changes with a 
material effect on net income or shareholders' equity. Consequently 
it is not plausible that accounting changes influence their 
judgments. 
With the help of the investment reports we are able to examine the 
following possible determinants of the individual investment analyst's 
level of fixation: 
(1) the level of disclosure of the accounting change; 
(2) the moment the accounting change is announced or disclosed for the 
first time; 
(3) the kind of accounting change; 
(4) the type of organization that employs the investment analyst. 
The related hypotheses, stated in the null-alternative form, run as 
follows: 
(1) The level of fixation of investment analysts does not depend on the 
level of Information supply concerning the accounting change. 
(2) The level of fixation of investment analysts does not depend on the 
moment the accounting change is announced for the first time. 
(3) The level of fixation of investment analysts does not depend on the 
kind of accounting change. 
(U) The level of fixation of investment analysts does not depend on the 
type of organization that employs the investment analysts. 
Other possible determinants of the individual investment analyst's level of 
fixation include the materiality of the accounting change, the level of 
education of the investment analyst, the experience in company analysis of 
the investment analyst and the time spent by the investment analyst 
composing the investment report. The first-mentioned determinant is not 
applicable to our study, because we confine ourselves to accounting changes 
with a material effect on net income or shareholders' equity. The other 
determinants cannot be examined satisfactorily on the basis of the 
available investment reports. 
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5 Research Findings 
In this section we discuss the different accounting changes divided among 
four categories and test the hypotheses that we have formulated above. 
5.1 Accounting Changes and the Level of Fixation 
With respect to each accounting change we have determined the level of 
fixation according to the formula given in subsection 4.3. However, it 
should be noted that in three cases the accounting changes solely affected 
extraordinary income. In these instances we have calculated also a 
'corrected' index of fixation. Then investment analysts, although fixated 
at the strong or weak level according to our definition, consider the 
effect of the accounting change implicitly if they consider extraordinary 
income in their analyses. Thus for the calculation of the 'corrected' 
indices of fixation we consider the strongly and weakly fixated investment 
analysts as being not fixated if they take into account extraordinary 
income in their analyses. 
Changes in Accounting Policy on Investment Grants 
The changes in accounting policy concerning investment grants were 
generally induced by changes in the Investment Incentives Act (Wet op de 
Investeringsrekening; WIR). This act dates from 1978. Originally, WIR 
premiums were granted by the government irrespective of whether the company 
receiving those premiums had to pay any income tax. The WIR premium 
consisted of a basic premium and a number of possible additional premiums, 
such as the small-scale premium and environmental premium. However, the 
Investment Incentive Act was changed twice. As a consequence of the first 
change the WIR premiums changed into tax credits; from 1 May 1986 on the 
grants formed deductions from the income taxes payable with the provision 
to carry back and carry forward for a limited number of years. The second 
change implied that from 29 February 1988 on the basic premium was reduced 
to zero. 
The Annual Reporting Guidelines allow either deducting investment grants 
from the cost of the related fixed assets or treating them as deferred 
credits (Guideline 3.01, paragraph 108). When applying the last alternative 
the investment grants generally should be amortized to net income over the 
assets' useful life. Investment subsidies in the form of tax credits should 
be presented in the income statement as deductions from income taxes 
(Guideline 2.53, paragraph 521-521b). However, with respect to WIR premiums 
granted after 30 April 1986 it was also tenable to continue the application 
of Guideline 1.03, paragraph 108 (see Bosman et al., 1993, pp. 211-212). 
Because the basic premium was reduced to zero the guideline allowed 
accelerated release of investment grants treated as a deferred credit 
(Guideline 3.01, paragraph 111). 
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Table 2: Changes in Treatment of Investment Grants 2 
Name of company 
and year of 
accounting change 
Level 
of 
dlsclosure 
Effect of change on Total 
number of 
analystsS 
Flxatlon Index 
of 
flxatlon Net Income Equity Strong Weak No 
KKK 19B7 0.833 + 43.3X X 12 1 5 6 0.292 
CCC 1988/89 0.200 - 6.8X A 14 9 1 4 0.679 
FFF 1989 0.100 + 15.2% A 21 15 5 1 0.833 
PPP 1989 0.800 + 7.4X A 13 3 0 10 0.231 
W V 1990* 0.800 + 20.4X A 
20 
(20) 
11 
( 3) 
3 
( 2) 
6 
(15) 
0.625 
(0.200) 
Changes In treatment of Investment grants 
80 
(80) 
39 
(31) 
14 
(13) 
27 
(36) 
0.575 
(0.469) 
A: not appllcable 
* Accounting change solely affected extraordlnary Income. The 'corrected' flgures are In parentheses. 
t Actually, it concerns the total number of organlzations of which we have examined Investment 
reports that dealt with the respectlve companies. Then, sometimes the Investment reports ara 
written by more than one Investment analyst. Furthermore, In certaln cases we had to examina more 
than one Investment report In order to determine the level of flxatlon. 
Table 2 shows five accounting changes concerning the treatment of WIR 
premiums with a material effect on net income. With respect to each 
accounting change we give the level of disclosure, thé effect on net income 
and the level of fixation of the investment analysts. 
Before the accounting changes went into effect, each company treated the 
WIR premiums as deferred credits putting them on an equalization account. 
The amounts periodically released in favour of the results, generally 
depended on the useful life of the related assets. The accounting policies 
concerning WIR premiums were changed as follows: 
the WIR premiums were deducted from income taxes on ordinary results 
in the year the premiums were granted by KKK. The balance of the 
equalization account at the end of the preceding financial year was 
accounted for in the income statement as an extraordinary item; 
the release was directly added to the equity by CCC; 
the release in favour of the results was accelerated by FFF and PPP; 
the balance of the equalization account at the end of the financial 
year was accounted for in the income statement as an extraordinary 
item by WV. 
It appears that the level of disclosure among the companies differs 
considerably with FFF and KKK at the extremes. The annual report of CCC and 
FFF did not explicitly state that an accounting change was made, contrary 
to the other three cases. PPP and WV, on the other hand, even quantified 
the influence of the accounting change on subsequent financial years. None 
of the companies involved adjusted the figures of the preceding year to the 
new accounting method. 
The overall level of fixation amounts to 0.586. It appears that the level 
of fixation ranges from 0.842 concerning the FFF case to 0.200 concerning 
the W V case. We have recalculated the index of fixation with respect to 
the W V case, because the accounting change adopted by W V solely affected 
We have dlsgulsed the names of the companies. They wlll be released In the Autumn of 1994 at the 
publication of the final results of our study. 
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extraordinary income. As explained earlier, investment analysts who take 
into account extraordinary income in such a case are actually not fixated 
even if they do not note the accounting change in their analyses at all. 
Capitalization of Publishing Rights 
The three largest Dutch publishers revised with retrospective effect the 
accounting principles concerning publishing rights. As a consequence, 
significant portions of goodwill - charged directly to shareholders' equity 
in the past - were reinstated as publishing rights. Furthermore, the 
companies adopted an approach under which the publishing rights will not be 
subject to systematic amortization (anymore). The purpose of the accounting 
change was to give a more realistic view of the shareholders' equity and to 
come into line with international developments regarding the accounting 
treatment of publishing rights. 
According to Dutch law intangible fixed assets should be valued at 
acquisition cost (section 384, paragraph 1 and section 385, paragraph 4, 
Civil Code Book 2). Furthermore, the law states that fixed assets with a 
limited useful life should be depreciated systematically (section 386, 
paragraph 4). In a discussion memorandum the Council on Annual Reporting 
interpretes the law to say that only purchased intangibles which are 
identifiable and separable should be capitalized. Specifically, with 
respect to publishing rights it discusses the pros and cons of systematic 
amortization, without offering lts own view (Appendix to Guideline 2.01). 
The discussion memorandum was issued in June 1991, after the accounting 
changes wire made by the publishers. 
Table 3: Capitalization of Publishing Rights 3 
Name of corapany 
and year of 
accounting change 
LeveX 
of 
Disclosure 
Effect of change on Total 
number of 
analysts* 
Fixation Index 
of 
fixation Net income Equity A Strong Waak No 
XXX X989 1.000 A + 46.9X 23 7 4 3 9 0.344 
YYY X989 X.000 A + 63.83! 14 2 3 w 8 0.292 
ZZZ 1990 0.833 A + 86.4X 16 X 5 X 9 0.367 
Capitalization of publishing rights 53 10 12 5 26 0.337 
A: not applicable 
* Actually, it concerns the total number of organizations of which we have examined investment 
reports that dealt with the respective companies. Ihen, sometimes the investment reports are 
written by more than one investment analyst. Furthermore, in certain cases we had to examine more 
than one investment report in order to determine the level of fixation. 
The changes under consideration in this subsection are remarkable in that 
the three publishers agreed upon the updating and harmonization of their 
accounting policies with regard to publishing rights. Thus it is not 
surprising that the information supplied by the three publishers is quite 
similar. In addition to the notes to the financial statements, the 
publishers discussed the accounting changes in their management reports 
rather extensively. Contrary to XXX and YYY, ZZZ did not give f uil 
disclosure of the accounting change. Then ZZZ did not disclose the year 
effect of the accounting change. However, with respect to XXX and YYY the 
year effect was nil, because they did not capitalize newly acquired 
See note 2. 
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publishing rights in the year of the accounting change. 
The accounting changes only affected shareholders' equity. This means that 
the examination of the level of fixation is only applicable to investment 
analysts who discuss in their reports, at least in some degree, the 
financial position or shareholders' equity of the companies. Then if they 
do not, the problem of fixation does not arise. The A-column of table 3 
contains the number of analysts who did not discuss at all the financial 
position or shareholders' equity of the companies in question. It concerns 
seven of the 21 XXX analysts, two of the fourteen YYY analysts and one of 
the sixteen ZZZ analysts. We do not consider the reports of these 
investment analysts further. This corresponds to the condition, formulated 
in subsection 4.2, that only investment reports in which investment 
analysts use accounting numbers are relevant to us. 
Table 3 shows that the differences between the three cases concerning the 
level of fixation are small. This finding is consistent with the fact that 
the accounting changes and the accompanying information supply were co-
ordinated by the companies involved. Furthermore, it appeared that within a 
certain organization (bank or firm of stockbrokers) often the same 
investment analyst(s) analyzed the three publishing companies. 
A problem that emerges from the investment reports is that the investment 
analysts do not believe the balance sheet of the publishing companies 
reflect adequately the financial position of these companies. A number of 
investment analysts, discussing the financial position of the publishers, 
even stated that despite the accounting change the financial position is 
not reflected well in the balance sheets. By way of illustration the 
investment analysts often made comparisons between the shareholders' equity 
and the market value of the publishers. Approximately half of the not 
strongly fixated investment analysts referred to the possible economie 
benefits of the accounting change, especially with respect to acquisition 
policy. 
Changes from Current Cost to Historïcal Cost Accounting 
According to section 384, paragraph 1 the choice of accounting principles 
should be guided by the prescriptions of section 362, paragraph 1-4. The 
accounting principles which may be applied are the acquisition or 
construction cost and, with respect to tangible fixed assets, financial 
fixed assets and stocks current value as well. Section 362 is concerned 
with the insight the financial statements should provide into the financial 
position and results of the company. If necessary in order to provide a 
good insight into its financial position and results the company should 
include information supplementary to that required by the Act or even 
diverge from the legal requirements. On the basis of section 384, paragraph 
1 and the explanatory memorandum to this section three situations can be 
dist ingui she d:* 
(1) the balance sheet and the income statement are prepared at current 
cost. However, in this case the revaluation of fixed assets must be 
stated, which means that information on the book value at historical 
cost is provided (section 368, paragraph 2a). This is not mandatory 
with respect to stocks; 
(2) the balance sheet and the income statement are prepared at historical 
cost, with current cost information provided in the footnotes; 
(3) the balance sheet and the income statement are prepared at historical 
cost, with no current cost information in the footnotes. The omission 
Saa Bosman at al., pp. 58-59. 
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of this information must be justified by the circumstances. 
In case of current cost accounting the difference between the book value 
before and after the revaluation must be added to a revaluation reserve 
(section 390, paragraph 1). 
Table 4: Changes from Current Cost to Historical Cost Accounting 5 
Name of company 
and yaar of 
accounting exchange 
Level 
of 
Dlsclosure 
Effect of change on Total 
number of 
analysts* 
Fixation Indax of 
fixation Net income Equity Strong Waak No 
KKK 1988 1.000 + 11.5X X 9 0 3 6 0.167 
BBB 1990 1.000 + 4.0X A 1* 2 0 12 0.143 
GGG 1991 1.000 + 2.6X - 13.6Ï 14 2 6 6 0.357 
Changes from currant coat to historical cost accounting 37 4 9 24 0.230 
X: not applicable 
* Actually, it concerns the total number of organizations of which we have examined investment 
reports that dealt with the respective companies. Then, sometimes the investment reports are 
written by more than one investment analyst. Furthermore, in certain cases we had to examina more 
than one investment report in order to determine the level of fixation. 
Table 4 shows three changes from current cost to historical cost accounting 
with a material effect on net income or shareholders' equity. The companies 
adopted these changes in accounting principles particularly to conform with 
international accounting practices. Before the companies made the 
accounting changes, their income statements were based on current cost. 
However, with respect to their balance sheets, current cost accounting was 
applied only partly. KKK and BBB did not value their tangible fixed assets 
at current cost, whereas GGG did not value its stocks at current cost. 
Though KKK and BBB did not value tangible fixed assets at current cost, 
they provided current cost information about this balance sheet item in the 
explanatory notes. In addition to the current cost information included in 
the primary financial statements, each company provided similar information 
based on historical cost, whether or not in the form of (condensed) 
secondary financial statements. 
According to Dutch accounting standards, the cumulative effect should be 
directly reflected in shareholders' equity in case of changes from current 
cost to historical cost accounting. In consequence of the partial 
application of current cost accounting the cumulative effect of the 
accounting change (on shareholders' equity) was not material in case of KKK 
and BBB. For that reason the cumulative effect was not quantified and 
comparative balance sheet figures were not adjusted to the new accounting 
method in these cases. After the accounting changes were made, the primary 
financial statements of all companies were based on historical cost with 
additional information based on current cost, whether or not in the form of 
(condensed) secondary financial statements. Thus actually each company 
changed from situation (1) to situation (2). 
In all three cases the companies announced the accounting change for the 
first time in March or April of the financial year in which the accounting 
change was adopted. Subsequently, KKK and BBB discussed the accounting 
changes rather extensively in their 1988 and 1990 interim reports 
respectively. They based these interim reports already on historical cost. 
See note 2. 
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GGG, on the other hand, did not discuss the accounting change in its 1991 
semi-annual report which was still based on current cost. Finally, all 
three companies fully disclosed the accounting change and its effects on 
accounting numbers in their annual reports. 
Table 4 shows low indices of fixation with respect to KKK and BBB. This 
could be due to the fact that these companies discussed the accounting 
changes already in their interim reports, whereas GGG did not. Another 
explanatory variable could be the relatively limited influence of the 
accounting change on the 1991 net income of GGG (2.6 per cent). However, it 
should be recognized that ordinary income increased by almost 7 per cent, 
because net income for the most part was composed of extraordinary items. 
Miscellaneous Accounting Changes 
The five accounting changes given in table 5 could not be classified among 
the categories dealt with above. All of them were induced particularly 
because of international developments. Table 5 gives an overview of the 
accounting changes in terms of the level of disclosure, the effects on net 
income and in each case the level of fixation of the investment analysts. 
Table 5: Miscellaneous Accounting Changes 6 
Name of company 
and year of 
accounting change 
Level 
of 
disclosure 
Effect of change on Total 
number of 
analystsG 
Fixation Index 
fixation Net income Equity Strong Waak No 
PPF 1989(a) 
PPP 1989(b) 
0.600 
0.500 
+ 14.0X 
+ 6.4X 
A 
A 
15 
15 
9 
12 
2 
2 
4 
1 
0.667 
0.867 
LLL 1989/90* 1.000 + 16.IX A 
11 
(11) 
4 
( 2) 
2 
( 1) 
5 
( 8) 
0.455 
(0.227) 
UUU 1990 1.000 
(/) + 6.7X 
(£) - 5.9X 
A 19 0 9 10 0.237 
KKK 1991* 0.800 + 14.9X A 
19 
(19) 
19 
( 0) 
0 
( 0) 
0 
(19) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
Miscellaneous accounting changes 
79 
(79) 
44 
(23) 
15 
(14) 
20 
(42) 
0.652 
(0.380) 
A: not applicable 
* Accounting change solely affected extraordinary income. The 'corrected' figures are in parentheses. 
1 Actually, it concerns the total number of organizations of which we have examined investment 
reports that dealt with the respective companies. Then, sometimes the investment reports are 
written by more than one investment analyst. Furthermore, in certain cases we had to examina more 
than one investment report in order to determine the level of fixation. 
5.2 Testing of Hypotheses 
In this subsection we test the hypotheses as formulated in subsection 4.4. 
In the preceding subsection we have distinguished strongly, weakly and non-
fixated investment analysts. On the basis of this distinction we calculated 
indices of fixation, which indicate the overall level of fixation with 
respect to the different accounting changes. However, in order to test the 
hypotheses we have put together the weakly and not fixated investment 
analysts. Then it is not unlikely that weakly fixated investment analysts 
' See note 2. 
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take into consideration the effects of accounting changes on accounting 
numbers, although they omit in whole or in part a discussion of these 
effects in their investment reports. The decision of weakly fixated 
investment analysts not to discuss (fully) the effects of the accounting 
change explicitly is probably done consciously. 
Hypo thesis (1): 
The level of fixation of investment analysts does not depend on the 
level of Information supply concerning the accounting change. 
In order to apply a x2-test we have divided the accounting changes into the 
following two groups: 
(1) accounting changes with a high level of disclosure. The level of 
disclosure amounts to 0.800 or more, i.e., none or only one 
disclosure element was omitted; 
(2) accounting changes with a low level of disclosure. The level of 
disclosure amounts to less than 0.800, i.e., more than one disclosure 
element was omitted. 
We have classified the accounting changes adopted by CCC, FFF and PPP as 
accounting changes with low levels of disclosure. The remaining accounting 
changes have high levels of disclosure. 
In table 6 we find with respect to both groups the number of investment 
analysts who appeared to be strongly fixated and not strongly fixated. 
Table 6: Level of Disclosure and Level of Fixation 
Level of disclosure 
Fixation 
Row total 
Strong Not strong 
High 25 149 174 
Low 45 20 65 
Column total 70 159 239 
X2: 68.776; p: 0.000 
Based on the results of the x2"test we can reject the hypothesis that the 
level of fixation does not depend on the level of Information supply 
concerning the accounting change. Although the results might be convincing, 
it should be borne in mind that different types of accounting changes are 
involved. The type of accounting change as a possible determinant of the 
investment analyst's level of fixation is discussed later in this 
subsection (hypothesis (3)). 
In order to control for the type of accounting change we have done the same 
test exclusively with respect to the changes in the treatment of investment 
grants. In this category the level of disclosure was high with respect to 
three accounting changes (KKK 1987, PPP, V W 1990) and low with respect to 
two accounting changes (CCC, FFF). The test results confirmed the findings 
from above (x2: 24.071; p: 0.000). However, notwithstanding the f act that 
the cases in this test are all concerned with changes in the treatment of 
investment grants that have a material effect on net income, there are some 
differences left that could influence the investment analyst's level of 
fixation, e.g., the sense in which the treatment of investment grants 
changed, whether ordinary income is affected or not and the direction of 
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the effect on income. In order to reinforce our findings, we have drawn a 
comparison between the two cases which look alike most, viz., FFF and PPP. 
The similarities between the two cases are: 
the amortization of the investment grants in favour of the results 
was accelerated; 
ordinary income was affected positively; 
compared to the former financial year net income increased; 
the accounting change was adopted in 1989. 
We have also taken into account the organizations the investment analysts 
are employed with, because this could also be an explanatory variable of 
their level of fixation (see later in this subsection at the discussion of 
hypothesis (4)). A x2"test confirmed the earlier conclusion, i.e., again 
the hypothesis that the level of fixation does not depend on the level of 
disclosure can be rejected (x2: 7.500; p: 0.006). Thus the different levels 
of fixation concerning the FFF and PPP case are most probably due to the 
different levels of disclosure on the accounting changes. In the FFF case 
net income was even affected twice as much as in the PPP case. Thus from a 
materiality perspective it would be expected that the difference between 
the two cases concerning the level of fixation would be in the opposite 
direction. 
Hypothesis (2): 
The level of fixation of investment analysts does not depend on the 
moment the accounting change is announced for the first time. 
In order to test hypothesis (2) we distinguish the following two groups of 
accounting changes: 
(1) early announcements: the first announcement occurred in the course of 
the financial year the accounting change was made, e.g., at the 
release of the preliminary/final annual returns or in the annual 
report of the preceding financial year; 
(2) late announcements: the first announcement occurred at the release of 
the preliminary/final annual returns or in the annual report of the 
financial year the accounting change was made. 
We have classified the accounting changes adopted by FFF, ZZZ, KKK (1988), 
BBB and GGG as early announcements and thè accounting changes adopted by 
KKK (1987), CCC, PPP, YYY (1989), XXX, W V (1990), PPP, LLL, UUU and KKK 
(1991) as late announcements.7 
In table 7 we find with respect to the early as well as the late 
announcements the number of investment analysts who appeared to be strongly 
fixated and not strongly fixated. 
We consider the accounting change adopted by UUU beginning in 1990 as a late announcement 
notwithstanding the fact that UUU gave full disclosure of the accounting change and its effect» 
a year bef ore at the release of the 1989 final annual returns and in the 1989 annual report. 
However, the attention paid to the accounting change in the 1990 annual report was limited. 
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Table 7: Moment of Announcement and Level of Fixation 
Moment of announcement 
Fixation 
Row total 
Strong Not strong 
Early 24 49 73 
Late 46 120 166 
Column total 70 169 239 
X2: 0.653; p: 0.419 
The results of the x 2 _ t e s t show that we cannot rej eet the hypothesis that 
the level of fixation does not depend on the moment the accounting change 
is announced for the first time. 
In order to control for the level of disclosure, which is a determinant of 
the level of fixation, we have done the same test excluding the accounting 
changes with low levels of disclosure (lower than 0.800). The test results 
confirmed the findings from abové (x2: 0.521; p: 0.470). It could be 
expected that the level of fixation of investment analysts with respect to 
early announcements would be lower than with respect to late announcements, 
because investment analysts are confronted with information about the 
accounting change at several points in time during the 'transition period' 
(i.e., the moment the accounting change is announced for the first time up 
to and including the moment of (full) disclosure in the annual report). 
According to the test results, however, this seems not to be the case. 
Hypo thesis (3): 
The level of fixation of investment analysts does not depend on the 
kind of accounting change. 
As indicated in subsection 4.1, we have divided the accounting changes 
among the following four categories: 
(1) changes in the treatment of investment grants; 
(2) capitalization of publishing rights; 
(3) changes from current cost to historical cost accounting; 
(4) miscellaneous accounting changes. 
In order to test whether the type of accounting change is an explanatory 
variable of the level of fixation of investment analysts we have applied a 
X2-test. Table 8 shows with respect to each type of accounting change the 
total number of investment analysts who appeared to be strongly fixated and 
not strongly fixated. 
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Table 8: Kind of Accounting Change and Level of Fixation 
Kind of 
accounting change 
Fixation 
Row total 
Strong Not strong 
Investment grants 31 49 80 
Publishing rights 12 31 43 
Current/historical cost 4 33 37 
Miscellaneous 23 56 79 
Column total 70 169 239 
X2: 9.598; p: 0.022 
On the basis of the findings presented in table 8 we can reject the 
hjrpothesis that the level of fixation does not depend on the kind of 
accounting change. Because the level of disclosure appears to be a 
determinant of the level of fixation, we have also done a x2_test exclusive 
the accounting changes with low levels of disclosure (lower than 0.800). 
The test results confirmed the findings from above (x2: 11.052; p: 0.011). 
The relatively low number of strongly fixated investment analysts with 
respect to the changes from current cost to historical cost accounting 
(10.8 per cent) might be due to the fact that investment analysts consider 
them as fundamental changes. The relatively high number of strongly fixated 
investment analysts with respect to the capitalization of publishing rights 
(27.9 per cent), on the other hand, might be due to the fact that these 
changes did not affect income numbers. In order to determine the level of 
fixation we have only considered investment reports that contain 
Information about the shareholders' equity or financial position of the 
company. However, the investment analysts generally paid more attention to 
the company's income numbers. Thus the strongly fixated investment analysts 
possibly did not notice the accounting change, because it was actually 
concerned with Information that they considered to be of less importance. 
Hypothesis (A-): 
The level of fixation of investment analysts does not depend on the 
type of organization that employs the investment analysts. 
We have examined investment reports issued by 41 banks or firms of 
stockbrokers and articles published in three financial magazines and one 
financial newspaper. However, most banks/firms of stockbrokers did not 
analyze all companies involved in our study, Furthermore, it appeared that 
although they did analyze companies involved in our study, they did not 
issue investment reports in the required periods or they did not have the 
required investment reports anymore. 
Up till now we have put journalists of the financial press and their 
articles on a par with investment analysts employed with banks or firms of 
stockbrokers and their investment reports respectively. In table 9 we 
present separately the organizations (banks/firms of stockbrokers, 
financial magazines and the financial newspaper) of which we could 
determine the level of fixation with respect to at least half of the 
sixteen accounting changes. We have put together the banks and firms of 
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stockbrokers that did not meet this criterion. The table contains also the 
(aggregate) index of fixation with respect to each organization. 
Table 9: Employers of the Investment Analysts and Level of Fixation 
Name of employer 
Total 
number of 
cases 
Fixation Index 
of 
fixation Strong Waak No 
AA 14 4 2 S 0.357 
BB 14 4 3 7 0.393 
CC 13 6 3 4 0.577 
DD 10 4 1 5 0.450 
EE 11 2 3 6 0.318 
FF 16 5 3 8 0.406 
GG 15 3 3 9 0.300 
HH 9 6 1 2 0.722 
Othex banks/fixins of stockbrokers (33) 75 20 16 39 0.373 
Subtotal banks/firms of stockbrokers 177 54 35 88 0.404 
RR 16 4 2 10 0.313 
SS 15 5 1 9 0.367 
TT 15 6 2 7 0.467 
UU 16 1 1 14 0.094 
Subtotal financial press 62 16 6 40 0.306 
Grand total 239 70 41 128 0.379 
In table 9 we have made a distinction between the investment analysts 
employed with banks or firms of stockbrokers and the journalists of the 
financial press. The level of fixation of the former category appears to be 
0.404 with the investment analysts of GG (0.300) and HH (0.722) at the 
extremes. The high level of fixation concerning HH might be a consequence 
of the fact that one and the same investment analyst analyzed eight of the 
nine companies. In none of the cases that investment analyst paid attention 
to the accounting changes at all. However, with respect to two accounting 
changes, which merely affected extraordinary income, we had to qualify him 
as not being fixated. Then because he considered extraordinary income in 
his analyses, he took into account the effects of these accounting changes 
implicitly. 
The level of fixation of the latter category, the journalists of the 
financial press, amounts to 0.306. Within this category the extremely low 
index of fixation with respect to the journalists of UU (0.094) is notable. 
In order to test the hypothesis that the level of fixation does not depend 
on the type of organization that employs the investment analysts 
(banks/firms of stockbrokers versus financial press) a x2"test w a s 
1
 He have disguised the names of the employers. They will be released in the Autumn of 1994 at the 
publication of the final results of our study. 
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performed. Agaln we have put together the weakly and not fixated investment 
analysts when applying the x2"test- Then although weakly fixated investment 
analysts omit in whole or in part a discussion of the effects of accounting 
changes on accounting numbers, it is not unlikely that they take into 
account these effects. 
Table 10: Category of Organizations and Level of Fixation 
Category of organizations 
Fixation 
Row total 
Strong Not Strong 
Banks/firms of stockbrokers 54 123 177 
Financial.press 16 46 62 
Column total 70 169 239 
X2: 0.490; p: 0.484 
As can be read from table 10 this hypothesis cannot be rejected. As also 
appears from the indices of fixation in table 9 the differences between the 
two categories are small. However, not strongly fixated investment analysts 
employed with banks/firms of stockbrokers appear to be more often fixated 
at the weak level than not strongly fixated journalists of the financial 
press, 28.5 and 13 per cent respectively. Thus journalists of the financial 
press often discuss accounting changes more extensively than investment 
analysts employed with banks/firms of stockbrokers do. This could be 
explained by the fact that articles of the financial press are mainly 
directed towards private investors, whereas investment reports of 
banks/firms of stockbrokers are mainly directed towards professionals, such 
as portfolio managers. If we apply a x2-test n o t putting together the 
weakly and not fixated investment analyst, as we have done in table 10, we 
find a p-value of 0.084 (x2: 4.953). 
Central hypothesis: 
Investment analysts do not appear to be fixated on accounting 
numbers. They take into consideration accounting changes with a 
material effect on net income or shareholders' equity. Consequently 
it is not plausible that accounting changes influence their 
judgments. 
On the basis of the four hypotheses tested before we can neither accept nor 
reject the central hypothesis. Then the level of disclosure is an important 
determinant whether investment analysts appear to be fixated or not. 
Furthermore, the fixation of investment analysts depends on the type of 
accounting change. The moment the accounting change is announced for the 
first time, on the other hand, does not appear to be a determinant of the 
fixation of investment analysts. Finally, the fixation of investment 
analysts employed with banks or firms of stockbrokers does not differ 
significantly from that of journalists of the financial press. Although the 
journalists of the financial press, generally, pay more attention to 
accounting changes than investment analysts employed with banks or firms of 
stockbrokers do. 
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6 Summary 
In the current paper we have examlned to what extent individual investment 
analysts appear to be fixated on accounting numbers in a real world 
setting. Previous studies in this research area were all put into an 
experimental setting. However, the high degree of internal validity, which 
experiments might have, is often accompanied by a low degree of external 
validity. Thus the conclusions drawn in an experiment are not simply 
generalizable beyond the experimental setting. The external validity could 
be enlarged by abandoning experiments and examining the real world 
situation instead. In our study we do that through the examination of the 
investment reports written by investment analysts with respect to 
individual companies that adopted changes in accounting principles. 
However, it might be difficult to isolate the effects of an accounting 
change on the judgments (or recommendations) of investment analysts, 
because these judgments (or recommendations) are determined by a range of 
variables. Thus compared to experiments there is an increase in realism, 
but a decrease in control over the study. The latter reduces the 
possibility of testing the influence of functional fixation on the 
judgments of investment analysts considerably. However, the likelihood that 
the judgments of investment analysts are affected might depend on their 
level of fixation. Furthermore, it should be noted that the level of 
fixation of investment analysts might influence the decisions of investors 
who rely on their judgments and interpretations. 
In our study we have examined how investment analysts dealt with sixteen 
material accounting changes adopted by companies listed at the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange. We distinguished two levels of fixation, viz., fixation at 
the strong and weak level. It appeared that the level of fixation differed 
among the various accounting changes. With the help of the investment 
reports we have examined whether the level of fixation of investment 
analysts could be explained by the following variables: 
(1) the level of disclosure of the accounting change; 
(2) the moment the accounting change is announced for the first time; 
(3) the kind of accounting change; 
(4) the type of organization that employs the investment analyst. 
The level of disclosure and the type of accounting change appeared to be 
important determinants of the fixation of investment analysts. The moment 
the accounting change was announced for the first time, on the other hand, 
did not appear to be a determinant of the fixation of investment analysts. 
Although journalists of the financial press, generally, paid more attention 
to accounting changes than investment analysts employed with banks or firms 
of stockbrokers did, the fixation on accounting numbers did not differ 
significantly between the two groups. On the basis of these findings we 
could neither accept nor reject the central hypothesis. 
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